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UNDER SECTION 210 OF THE
ENERGY REORGANIZATION
ACT
Macktal v. Secretary of Labor'
I. INTRODUCTION
In seeking to encourage nuclear industry employees to report safety concerns,
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) acts to protect such
"whistle-blowers" in the event they are terminated or discriminated against because
of their whistle-blowing activities.2 When an employee and an employer
negotiate a Section 210 "whistle-blower" complaint and subsequently submit the
settlement for approval, the Secretary of Labor faces certain encumbrances when
reviewing the agreement . This limitation on review arises when certain
provisions may be in violation of public policy.4 In Macktal v. Secretary of
Labor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit compared the
Secretary's Section 210 powers to those held by any judge considering civil suit
settlements and held that the Secretary may either accept the entire negotiated
settlement, reject it, or modify the settlement subject to input from the original
parties.5 This Note compares the Section 210 powers of the Secretary to review
whistle-blower settlements with similar powers found in the judiciary. This Note
also examines the lack of guidance other circuits offer when deciding similar cases
in light of a silent United States Supreme Court.
1. 923 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b) (1983).
3. 42 U.S.C. §5851(b).
4. Id.
5. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1156.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, Joseph J. Macktal, Jr., began work as a journeyman electrician for
Brown & Root in January 1985. One of plaintiff's assignments placed him at
the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant.7 During a four-month period in 1985-
1986, plaintiff raised technical safety concerns regarding the company's operations
at Comanche Peak to Brown & Root's in-house investigatory team.8 On January
2, 1986, Brown & Root issued a written warning to plaintiff about "excessive
absenteeism" during the preceding December. 9 The following day, plaintiff
notified his supervisor in writing that he believed he was being harassed because
of his identification of safety problems at Comanche Peak; in essence, plaintiff
believed he was being harassed as a whistle-blower.' ° At the end of his formal
complaint, plaintiff asked to be relieved of his duties until the matter could be
determined by regulatory authorities." Brown & Root interpreted this request
as plaintiff's resignation and escorted plaintiff off-site. 2
One month later, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 alleging that
Brown & Root discharged him because he was a whistle-blower.' 3 After filing
his complaint, plaintiff and Brown & Root agreed to settle the underlying dispute,
and plaintiff asked the Secretary to dismiss the complaint. 4 Among the
settlement terms, paragraph three of the agreement called for plaintiff to agree not
to appear voluntarily as a witness in any proceeding, administrative or judicial,
regarding the operational safety at Comanche Peak as well as to take reasonable
steps to resist a subpoena requiring his testimony at such a proceeding.' 5
While the Secretary considered the request, plaintiff changed his position on
the settlement and requested that the Secretary disapprove the agreement."
6. Id. at 1151.
7. d.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1151-52.
10. Id. at 1152.
11. Id. Plaintiff's final paragraph of his complaint to his supervisor stated: "In an effort to
preserve my mental health and avoid any further harassment, I wish to be relieved of my duties until
the TEC, NLRB, [and] NRC can resolve these matters." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851); see infra note 23 (containing the text of the statute).
14. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1152.
15. Id. Other terms of the agreement, as well as unrelated issues raised by plaintiff at various
points in the case at hand have been omitted for purposes of this Note.
16. Id. at 1153. Based on the original settlement, plaintiff and Brown & Root moved jointly to
dismiss, and the administrative law judge supervising the matter recommended that the Secretary grant
the motion. Id. at 1152-53. When the Secretary asked to see a copy of the agreement, Brown & Root
and plaintiffs original attorneys refused to comply and requested that the Secretary reconsider the
order. Id. at 1153. Plaintiff's new counsel later learned of the Secretary's request and provided the
Secretary with a copy of the settlement. Id.
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/13
WHISTLE-BLOWER SETTLEMENTS
Brown & Root opposed this request.1 7  Subsequently, the Secretary struck
paragraph three of the settlement as contrary to public policy but otherwise upheld
the settlement and dismissed the action.18
Plaintiff appealed the Secretary's decision and sought judicial review pursuant
to Section 210.19 In his appeal, plaintiff raised three other issues for
consideration: (1) he alleged that he withdrew his consent to the settlement before
the Secretary agreed to the settlement; (2) he alleged that he did not consent to the
agreement at the time it was negotiated; and (3) he alleged that even if it was
found that he did consent, his consent was not voluntary, but coerced by his own
attorneys.2" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the
Secretary's order and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with
its opinion.2' The court held: (1) when an employee files a Section 210
complaint charging that his employer discriminated against his whistle-blowing
activity and then subsequently settles with the employer, the Secretary of Labor
may either enter into the settlement by approving it or refuse to enter into it by
rejecting it; and (2) the Secretary may not modify material terms of the agreement
without consent of the parties.22
III. LEGAL HISTORY
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 forbids a nuclear
industry employer from either discriminating or retaliating against any employee
lodging a complaint with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.2 a Under this
statute, the Secretary of Labor is obligated to investigate any such complaints
filed.24 Within 30 days of receiving the complaint, the Secretary must complete
the investigation and notify the parties of the results. 25 Once the complaint is
filed and the investigation is completed, the Secretary must grant the relief sought,
deny such relief, or enter into a consensual settlement involving all three
17. Id. at 1153.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Id. at 1158.
22. Id. The court grounded the first part of its holding on its conclusions as to the three collateral
issues raised by plaintiff on his complaint. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1). This section states: "Any employee who believes that he has been
discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person [on account of whistle-blowing] may,
within thirty days after such violation occurs, file ... a complaint with the Secretary of Labor...
alleging such discharge or discrimination." Id.
24. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 556 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A)). The court considered the Secretary's authority to modify party settlements
under the statute and determined that the Secretary could not dismiss the complaint based on a
settlement where the settlement was originally silent regarding dismissal of claims. Id. at 556-57.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A).
1992]
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parties-the employee-complainant, the employer, and the Secretary. 6  The
Secretary must choose one of these actions within 90 days of receipt of the
complaint.27
In deciding the only other decision concerning Section 210 settlement
agreements, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
the Secretary had to approve all such settlement agreements and insisted that "[t] he
Secretary may not enter into a settlement terminating a proceeding on a complaint
without the participation and consent of the complainant."2 The court added that
the Secretary's power to approve settlement agreements "does not include the
power to force employees to accept a settlement." 29 The Thompson court also
noted that the Secretary's dismissal with prejudice added a material condition to
the parties' settlement and provided the employer with a benefit it had been unable
to secure in the original negotiations, that the plaintiff would be barred by res
judicata from raising additional complaints under the ERA based on the same
operative facts.3"
The Secretary of Labor has previously issued administrative regulations
specifying procedures to follow in deciding which settlement option to choose.3
Under these regulations, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division
conducts the investigation and enters a preliminary determination of the
complaint's merits. 32 If either party disputes the preliminary conclusions of the
division's investigation, an adversarial hearing may be requested before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) where each party may present evidence.3 At the
conclusion of such a hearing, the ALT will issue a recommended decision for the
Secretary.'
If the Secretary's application of Section 210 is rational and consistent with
the statute, then the judiciary must uphold the interpretation. 35 However, where
26. Id. This provision reads:
Within ninety days of the receipt of such complaint the Secretary shall, unless the
proceeding on the complaint is terminated by the Secretary on the basis of a settlement
entered into by the Secretary and the person alleged to have committed such violation,




28. Thompson, 885 F.2d at 556 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A)).
29. Id. at 557.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 29 C.F.R. § 24.4 (1990).
33. Id. § 24.5.
34. Id. § 24.6.
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984),
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227. The court held that the judiciary is the "final authority" on questions of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions contrary to "clear congressional
intent." Id. at 843 n.9. Likewise, the Secretary's authority begins with the language of the statute and
any authority claimed must be consistent with such text. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
(Vol. 1992, No. 1
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the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue, such as whether the
Secretary may dictate settlement terms or force a modified settlement upon the
parties, it is up to the judiciary to determine whether the administrative agency's
interpretation is grounded on a permissible construction of the statute.
36
The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Evans v. Jeff,
D.,37 where a class of handicapped children sought injunctive relief for alleged
defects in the education and care provided to them by the State of Idaho.38 As
part of its complaint, the class sought costs and attorney's fees.39  The
defendant's offer to settle required the plaintiffs to waive their right to attorney's
fees.' The district court, acting pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, approved the settlement with the fee waiver intact.4 However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the fee waiver,
in effect modifying a material term of the agreement without consent of the
parties.42
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in its view of the
district court's power to approve class action settlements.43 The Court stated that
"the power to approve or reject a settlement negotiated by the parties before trial
does not authorize the court to require the parties to accept a settlement to which
they have not agreed." 44 The Court also noted that "changed circumstances" may
empower a court to order modifications to a consent decree over a party's
objections after the decree has been entered and that the district court might have
notified the parties that it would not approve the settlement unless certain
provisions were deleted or modified. 45 However, the Court found that Rule 23(e)
"does not give the court the power, in advance of trial, to modify a proposed
consent decree and order its acceptance over either party's objection.",46 The
options available to the district court, were essentially to accept the proposed
settlement, reject the proposal and postpone the trial allowing the parties to reach
a different settlement, or try the case notwithstanding the settlement.47
Case law supports the idea of the pre-eminence of original settlement terms
over subsequent terms proposed by one party. Considering Title VII claims, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that the agreement must
Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1987)).
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
37. 475 U.S. 717 (1986), reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
38. Id. at 720.
39. Id. at 722.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 723-24.
42. Id. at 724.
43. Id. at 726.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 726-27.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 727.
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be entered into "voluntarily and knowingly" by the plaintiff. 4 Once that
threshold has been crossed, if a Title VII party who previously authorized a
settlement chooses later to change her mind regarding the terms, the original
language controls and that party is bound by the terms of the agreement.
49
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. Plaintiff's Claim Under Section 210
In Macktal, the court noted that the Secretary's selection of an adversarial
format before an administrative law judge for the required public hearing prompted
the parties to use civil litigation as an analogy in determining the appropriate
limits to the Secretary's authority.50 While the court acknowledged that such
analogies may be helpful in appraising the situation, an analogy cannot grant the
Secretary authority "withheld by the words of the statute," nor can it "deprive the
Secretary of authority provided by the words of the statute."5'
The words of the statute are clear, according to the court.5 2 The Secretary
is required to take one of three actions once a complaint is filed: accept the
settlement as submitted by the parties, reject the settlement, or negotiate a new
settlement with the parties." The court concluded that the statute allows no
exception for those cases where the complainant and the employer reach an
independent settlement.5 4
The court also acknowledged the Secretary's argument likening her role to
that of a civil judge determining a private contract settlement.55 In such a role
she could sever terms found in violation of public policy and still enforce the
remainder of the settlement.5 6 The court agreed that the Secretary may allow a
Section 210 complainant and the employer to negotiate a settlement and then
approve the agreement if it adequately protects the public's interest and equitably
treats the employee. 7 However, the court added, both the use of the term
"approval" describing the Secretary's actions and the analogy to civil litigation
"should not confuse us as to the nature of her authority."58
48. Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15. (1974)).
49. Id.; see Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1981); Harrop v. Western
Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1153.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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The court recognized that it must uphold the Secretary's interpretation of the
authority granted by Section 210 if it is rational and consistent with the statute.59
However, the Macktal Court noted that if the Secretary did not issue one of two
authorized orders, the Secretary would be permitted to terminate the action only
by entering into a settlement.' The Macktal court stated that "the only
reasonable interpretation we can give the words chosen by Congress is a
consensual settlement process involving all three parties."6" Thus, the court held
that it could not reasonably interpret the language "enter into a settlement" to
authorize the Secretary to "dictate" the settlement's terms or "force" a modified
settlement on the parties because "[s]uch power would be the antithesis of the
consensual settlement process contemplated by the statute."62
By limiting the Secretary's authority to either consent or not consent to
negotiated settlements, the court rejected as inconsistent with the statute the
Secretary's second argument: that she can strike certain terms while enforcing the
remainder without the consent of both the complainant and the employer.63 If
the Secretary wanted to modify material terms of the settlement, consent to the
proposed changes must be obtained from the other two parties.
64
The court bolstered its conclusions by examining the holdings in Evans and
Thompson.65  Utilizing the Evans analogy to comparable civil litigation
procedures involving Article Ill judges' consideration of negotiated settlements,
the court determined that the Secretary could either approve the original settlement
"as it was written," obtain consent from the plaintiff and Brown & Root to modify
the settlement, or reject the settlement as presented. 66  Similarly, the court
determined that the Secretary could not "take the negotiated settlement, strike
terms she (did] not like, and then impose it on the parties., 67
The court also agreed with the Thompson analysis that the Secretary's
authority to approve, settlements does not include the power to force
complainants-or even employers-to accept an agreement. Additionally, the
Macktal Court applied the Thompson material condition rationale whereby the
59. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 24.4.
60. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1154.
61. Id. In so holding, the court rejected the Secretary's arguments that Congress "misapprehended
the proper role of the Secretary under the statute" and that since the Secretary chose an adversarial
format for the requisite public hearing, the Secretary should be considered an "adjudicator" rather than
a party: "[w]e do not understand this reasoning." Id. at n.14. "The authority of the Secretary begins
with the words of the statute, and the question we must ask is whether the authority she claims is
consistent with those words.' Id. at 1154. The court refused to "rewrite the words of the statute so
that they are consistent with the authority claimed." Id.
62. Id. at 1154.
63. Id.
64. id.
65. Id. at 1155-56.
66. Id. at 1155; see Evans, 475 U.S. at 724-27.
67. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1155.
68. Id.; see Thompson, 885 F.2d at 556.
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severance of paragraph three "eliminated a material term of the agreement.""
The court concluded that "the Secretary cannot do [this] without the consent of the
other two parties."70
The court chose to define "material term" as one that a party "could not
customarily change in a private agreement without the consent of the other parties
to the agreement."7' In doing so, the court noted that the Secretary stated she
struck paragraph three and allowed the remainder of the agreement to stand
because it was not "essential" as defined by Section .184 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts. 72 Whether or not the stricken paragraph meets this
definition, the court held that "the evidence requires a finding that paragraph three
is not so unimportant that a party could add it to, or delete it from, a settlement
agreement without the consent of the other parties.
7 3
Concluding its analysis of the primary issues, the Macktal court instructed the
Secretary, on remand, to "either consent to the settlement, as written, or not."
74
If the Secretary elected not to accept the settlement as written, the options
remained to negotiate a new settlement with the other two parties, to allow
plaintiff and Brown & Root to negotiate a new settlement alone and submit it for
the Secretary's consent, or to hold a hearing "to determine which of [the] two
authorized orders [to] issue. 75
B. Plaintiff's Collateral Claims
Plaintiff's first collateral issue concerned his withdrawal of consent before the
Secretary consented to the settlement. 76  Section 210 states that the Secretary
may not agree to any settlement terminating a proceeding on a complaint "without
the participation and consent of the complainant."
77
Under contracts law, courts hold that a consent judgment "is a contract to end
a lawsuit in which the relief to be provided by the judgment and the wording to
effectuate that relief are agreed to by the parties. 78 Any agreement to settle a
claim may be enforced as a contract and ordinary rules of contract interpretation
69. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1155-56.
70. Id. at 1156.
71. Id.; see Thompson, 885 F.2d at 557.
72. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1156. The Second Restatement of Contracts reads:
If less than all of an agreement is unenforceable under the rule stated in § 178, a court
may nevertheless enforce the rest of the agreement in favor of a party who did not engage
in serious misconduct if the performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is
not an essential part of the agreed exchange.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1981).
73. Mackta 923 F.2d at 1156 n.25.
74. Id. at 1156.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A).
78. Interspace Inc. v. Morris, 650 F. Supp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see Janus Films, Inc. v.
Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1986).
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control.79 Therefore, courts have been reluctant to allow a party to withdraw
consent to a settlement that requires court approval in order to escape liability
under the terms of the settlement.80
The Macktal court found that, assuming plaintiff participated in and
consented to the settlement at the time of negotiation, Section 210 does not
explicitly require "second affirmation" of his consent when the Secretary grants
approval."' Requiring plaintiff's initial consent adequately protects his interest
and ensures that the employer and the Secretary will not agree to a second
12settlement contrary to plaintiff's interest. The court concluded that binding the
parties to their initial agreement allows the process to proceed without fear that
one or the other will withdraw from the arrangement before the Secretary
completes final review. 3
Plaintiffs second collateral issue concerned his consent to the actual
settlement." If the Secretary determines that the parties consented to the
agreement, the decision may be reversed by a federal court only if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."85
If the settlement involves a right to sue derived from a federal statute, federal not
state law, governs the validity of the settlement and, by extension, any actions of
the parties in direct relation to the settlement.8 6
Under federal law, oral agreements to settle are binding upon the parties to
the settlement.87 In Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,' the court held that
if a party to a Title VII suit who has previously authorized a settlement changes
his mind when presented with the settlement documents, he remains bound by the
terms of the settlement. 89
79. Interspace, Inc., 650 F. Supp. at 109; see Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 577 F. Supp.
852, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Mikropul Corp. v. Desimone & Chaplin-Airtech, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 940,
943 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
80. Interspace, Inc., 650 F. Supp. at 109; see Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 612 F. Supp.
1046, 1053-54 (M.D. Ala. 1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 575 (lth Cir. 1987); George v. Parry, 77 F.R.D. 421,
423 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid without op., 578 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947
(1978).
81. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1156-57.
82. Id. at 1157.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1156.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977); see also Thompson, 885 F.2d at 555.
86. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209
(federal law determines validity of oral settlement agreements in employment discrimination actions
brought pursuant to Title VII); Strange v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir. 1974)
(federal law determines validity of oral settlement agreements within federal courts' admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction).
87. Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. 662 F.2d 1207.
89. Id. at 1209.
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The court also rejected plaintiff's second collateral argument.90 In so
holding, the court refused to conclude that the Secretary's action was an abuse of
discretion.9' The court cited plaintiff's admission in his affidavit that he agreed
to the initial settlement as well as two versions of a general release92 and
plaintiff's acceptance of his proceeds stemming from the settlement as indicative
of his consent.93
In plaintiff's final collateral issue, he argued that pressure exerted by his
attorneys to accept the settlement voided his consent.94 In considering charges
of attorney misrepresentation regarding a settlement to a Title VII employee
discrimination action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that when a party voluntarily accepts an offer of settlement, "whether directly
or indirectly" through the authorized actions of his attorney, the agreement's
integrity cannot be attacked on grounds of inadequate representation by the party's
attorney. 95 Unless the ensuing settlement is substantially unfair, judicial economy
"commands that a party be held to the terms of a voluntary agreement. ' 9 In any
case, the court stated that disputes remain strictly between the party and his
attorney.
97
Finally, the court rejected this last collateral argument.98 In so holding, the
court recognized that the Secretary initially ruled that the alleged serious
misconduct by plaintiff's attorneys did not affect the validity of plaintiff's
consent. 99 The court acknowledged the two-pronged legal question arising from
such an allegation: (1) whether arguments, including any arguments which may
be quite heated, between a party to a settlement and his attorney regarding the
merits of accepting the settlement void any subsequent consent offered by the
party; and (2) which party should bear the risk of any alleged misconduct by the
attorney? 1"
To answer these questions, the court relied on the Secretary's initial ruling
that plaintiff-not Brown & Root, the other party to the initial settlement-should
bear the risk of alleged misconduct by plaintiff's attorney, in light of the
professional relationship between an attorney and his client, the plaintiff's right to
90. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1157.
91. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
92. Id. at 1157. These releases were signed by the plaintiff. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1156.
95. Petty v. Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Gilbert v. United States,
479 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. Petty, 849 F.2d at 133.
97. Id.
98. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1157.
99. Id. The Secretary cited the Petty decision among others to support her position. Id. at n.34.
100. Id. at 1157.
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
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counsel, and the availability of legal action against the attorney. 10 Therefore,
the court refused to void the settlement upon these allegations.
10 2
V. COMMENT
What role should the Secretary of Labor fulfill when considering a negotiated
settlement under the provisions of Section 210 of the ERA? What options may
be considered which give deference to an original agreement entered into between
the disputing complainant and employer? While considering plaintiff's original
complaint, the Secretary of Labor likened her role to that of a judge presiding over
a private contract dispute and argued that she should therefore be allowed to sever
any terms contrary to public policy."0 3 The Macktal court freely agreed with the
Secretary's association to the civil judiciary but rightly refused to grant the
Secretary carte blanche to modify material terms to negotiated settlements--even
where violations of public policy might occur-without the consent of the original
parties.1°4 In effect, the court shackled the Secretary's perceived power to the
encumbrances facing a judge contemplating negotiated settlements in civil matters.
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit by advancing the
analysis offered by the Thompson decision.'0 5 When considering Section 210
settlements, both circuits clearly hold that the Secretary may not force the original
parties to accept settlements to which they have not previously agreed.'0°  The
message advanced by these two circuits, grounded in logic forwarded by the
Supreme Court in Evans, seems clear: the Secretary simply cannot strike
settlement terms she does not like and then impose her will on the original parties;
the same encumbrances upon a judge considering a comparable settlement
transcend the gap between administrative and private law and attach to the
Secretary.'0°
It would seem that the Secretary should be able to strike certain provisions
as against public policy, thereby providing a second level of protection for the
employee-complainant. After all, it was public policy that originally encouraged
the employee-complainant to blow the whistle on nuclear power plant contractors
101. Id.
102. Id. This action, the court held, did not constitute abuse of discretion. Id. at 1157-58.
103. Id. at 1154.
104. Id. The court instead found it "inconsistent with the statute ... that [the Secretary) can strike
certain terms, and enforce the remainder, of a settlement without the consent of both the complainant
and the company." Id.
105. Id. at 1155.
106. Id.; see, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.2d at 557. In so holding, both circuits also protect the
original parties from being forced by the Secretary into material modifications to their original
agreements to which they have not consented. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1154.
107. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1155.
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and operators." a Such settlements may be products of mismatched "David and
Goliath" negotiations in which a lone employee chooses to stand up to a large,
economically superior corporation. As a second level of protection, the Secretary
should be afforded discretionary power to strike provisions contrary to public
policy."o
The Macktal court skirted this policy protection argument and instead focused
on protecting the relative positions of the parties.1 By applying the Thompson
analysis to the Macktal case, the court, in effect, held that the Secretary's action
to strike paragraph three added a material condition to the original agreement and
provided plaintiff with a benefit he was not able to achieve in his original
negotiation with Brown & Root."'
If parties voluntarily enter into a settlement and submit the agreement to the
Secretary for approval, the agreement terms should be viewed as prima facie
evidence of the intent of the parties. In the original settlement, plaintiff yielded
his right to continue his whistle-blowing activities in subsequent administrative and
judicial proceedings and therefore conferred a substantial benefit to Brown &
Root. 2 Regardless of plaintiff's other allegations concerning the settlement, he
never expressed dissatisfaction with paragraph three. By his silence, one may
conclude he approved the provision.
If the court upheld the Secretary's decision, Brown & Root would forfeit this
negotiated benefit without being afforded an opportunity to offer input to the
Secretary. The danger of such precedent is that while this matter involved a
benefit forfeited by the employer, the next reviewing court could encounter a
supposedly protected employee who forfeited a negotiated benefit without a forum
for input.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its holding, the Macktal court bolsters protection of original settlements
entered into and submitted under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act.
By requiring the Secretary to either accept, reject, or modify Section 210
settlements with the consent of the original parties, the court has not barred the
Secretary from influencing the agreement or advancing public policy. On the
108. See generally Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope For
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERs L. REV. 355 (1991). The Energy Reorganization Act seeks to 'protect
employees who assist or participate in actions to carry out the purposes of the federal statutes
regulating the nuclear energy industry." Id. at 408-09 n.351.
109. The very nature of the stricken provision of the settlement in Macktal aptly illustrates such
an argument. The entire matter began when plaintiff identified potential problems with the construction
of the Comanche Peak plant. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1151. Any settlement provision wherein he agrees
to resist testifying at any investigatory proceeding concerning the safe operation of Comanche Peak
would fly in the face of the policy buttressing Section 210.
110. Macktal, 923 F.2d at 1155.
111. See Thompson, 885 F.2d at 557.
112. Maccal, 923 F.2d at 1152.
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contrary, the Secretary's power to reject the entire settlement as against public
policy has not been invalidated. Any policy concerns held by the Secretary need
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